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Rumours and markets
Abstract
The paper presents a simple model to study the effects of rumours on markets. Agents in our economy
communicate with their local neighbours which gives rise to the possible spread of a rumour. As the
rumour affects beliefs of the agents the evolution of the rumour has a direct impact on market outcomes.
Our results show that if the rumour dies out long-run equilibrium prices correspond to pre-rumour
values. However, if the rumour stays present it produces a price run-up for the good that is positively
targeted by the rumour. Price run-ups related to rumours have been observed in empirical studies by
Rose [Rose, A.M., 1951. Rumor in the stock market. Public Opinion Quarterly 15, 461-486], Pound and
Zeckhauser [Pound, J., Zeckhauser, R., 1990. Clearly heard on the street: the effect of takeover rumors
on stock prices. Journal of Business 63, 291-308] and Zivney et al. [Zivney, T., Bertin, W.J.,
Torabzadeh, K.M., 1996. Overreaction to take-over speculation. Quarterly Review of Economics and
Finance 36, 89-115]. The present model provides an analytical foundation for this finding.
Rumours and Markets∗
Michael Kosfeld†
University of Zurich‡
Abstract
The paper presents a simple model to study the effects of rumours on
markets. Agents in our economy communicate with their local neighbours
which gives rise to the possible spread of a rumour. As the rumour affects be-
liefs of the agents the evolution of the rumour has a direct impact on market
outcomes. Our results show that if the rumour dies out long-run equilib-
rium prices correspond to pre-rumour values. However, if the rumour stays
present it produces a price run-up for the good that is positively targeted by
the rumour. Price run-ups related to rumours have been observed in empiri-
cal studies by Rose (1951), Pound and Zeckhauser (1990), and Zivney et al.
(1996). The present model provides an analytical foundation for this finding.
Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: D11, D51
Keywords: rumour, market, price run-up
∗Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics 41, 2005, 646-664.
†I am grateful to Anke Gerber, Dolf Talman, Fernando Vega-Redondo, an anonymous referee
and especially Larry Samuelson for many detailed and constructive comments. I also thank seminar
participants in Vienna, Oberwesel, Tilburg, Berlin, Dortmund, Amsterdam and Zurich for helpful
discussions. This research has been supported by the European Commission through a Marie Curie
Fellowship at CentER, Tilburg University.
‡Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, Blu¨mlisalpstrasse 10, CH-8006 Zurich, Switzer-
land. eMail: kosfeld@iew.unizh.ch
“Rumour, ... speed lends her strength, and
she wins vigour as she goes, ... clinging to
the false and wrong, yet heralding truth.”
— Vergil, Aeneis, Book IV.
1 Introduction
Rumours are part of our everyday life. Sometimes they contain confidential infor-
mation about public figures, in other cases they have hot news concerning important
social or economic issues. Rumours can shape the public opinion of a society or a
market by affecting and coordinating the individual beliefs of its members.
Although rumours are well-known in real life they are almost absent in economic
theory. Only in recent years economists have started to look at rumours, both from a
theoretical and an empirical point of view (cf. Koenig, 1985, Kapferer, 1989, Pound
and Zeckhauser, 1990, Banerjee, 1993, Zivney, Bertin, and Torabzadeh, 1996; an
early exemption is Rose, 1951). The reason seems intuitive. While economic theory
focuses mainly on rational behaviour, rumours were often thought to be something
rather irrational. In some sense, they did not fit into the model.
The aim of this paper is to propose an analytical framework for studying the
effects of rumours on markets. Our model combines standard microeconomic theory
and particle system theory in a way that we can analyze (i) the spread of a rumour
through word-of-mouth communication and (ii) the rumour’s impact on demand and
prices of goods in a competitive market. Roughly said, our main results show that if
word-of-mouth communication is strong enough the rumour produces a significant
price run-up for the good that is positively targeted by the rumour. Price run-
ups related to rumours have been observed in an early study by Rose (1951) and
more recently by Pound and Zeckhauser (1990) and Zivney et al. (1996). To our
knowledge the present model provides the first analytical foundation for this finding.
Rose (1951) considers the short-run movement of a sample of US stock prices
during periods between 1937 and 1938 and between 1948 and 1949. The author
calculates a so-called “factor of stickiness” to measure the effect of rumour. His
findings support the hypothesis that if rumour affects stock prices, it will do so by
“creating a unidirectional trend” (Rose, 1951, p468), i.e., it will cause prices to move
in a single direction over some short period of time.
Pound and Zeckhauser (1990) have examined the effects of takeover rumours on
stock prices. They study a sample of rumours published in the “Heard on the Street”
(HOTS) column that appears daily in theWall Street Journal. Using a sample from
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1983 until 1985, their main findings are as follows. (1) The market reacts efficiently
to published rumours, i.e., no excess returns could be realized by buying (or selling)
rumoured takeover targets at the time the rumour appeared in the press. (2) In
the period immediately before publication of the rumour, a sizeable and consistent
price run-up for the takeover target occurs, while on the day of publication itself no
significant reaction of the market can be observed. (3) Rumours correctly predicted
imminent takeover bids less than half of the time.
Zivney et al. (1996) take a similar approach but consider both the HOTS and the
“Abreast of the Market” (AOTM) column in the Wall Street Journal to identify the
correct initial rumour publication date.1 They focus on the period from 1985 until
1988 since articles dealing with rumour information were most numerous in 1988.
Their main findings are that similarly to Pound and Zeckhauser (1990) the market
generally reacts efficiently to rumour publication. However, rumours published in
the AOTM column lead to a clear short-term overreaction, giving rise for profitable
investment opportunities. Moreover, like Pound and Zeckhauser (1990) they also
observe a significant price run-up during the 20 day period before publication of the
rumour.
The present paper focuses on the observed price run-up as one of the main
empirical findings in the studies above. Our model can explain the run-up as a
direct consequence of communication between traders in a competitive market. Due
to a rumour that is transmitted from one trader to another, individual beliefs and
trading strategies are affected, thereby leading to a price run-up for the good that
is positively targeted by the rumour. The transmission of the rumour relies on local
communication between traders, which follows an infection dynamic as a typical
mechanism for the spread of a rumour. Our model thus endogenizes the evolution
of market prices as a result of rumour diffusion among traders in the economy.
The idea of using infection dynamics for the transmission of a rumour is also part
of the model discussed in Banerjee (1993). Banerjee uses an individual Bayesian
updating approach to obtain a stochastic process that describes the evolution of a
rumour in time. The dynamics are approximated through a system of differential
equations that are known from the epidemiological literature. Results are then
obtained from an analysis of the approximating deterministic system.
Contrary to Banerjee’s model we take a simplifying step and model the rumour
transmission as a purely mechanical act. The gain is that we can analyze the sto-
chastic process directly. In particular, we do not have to approximate the process
1The reason is that, usually, some days or weeks before a rumour is published in the HOTS
column it appears in the AOTM column.
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in order to obtain results about the evolution of the rumour.2 The second and main
difference of our model is that communication between agents is restricted to lo-
cal neighbourhoods. While Banerjee’s approach assumes agents to meet all other
agents in the population, i.e., transmission of the rumour is global, we believe that
the assumption of local interaction is more appropriate for studying the dynamics
of a rumour. Mostly, rumours reach us through people that are closely connected to
us, through friends, people living next door, and colleagues for example. Moreover,
since rumours often arise in case of uncertainty, we also discuss rumours mostly with
our immediate environment in order to get a clearer picture of the situation.
Other models that are similar in spirit focussing on interaction through word-
of-mouth communication or recruitment mechanisms include Banerjee (1992),
Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch (1992), Kirman (1993), Ellison and Fuden-
berg (1995) and Vettas (1997, 1998). The main difference with respect to these
models lies in the underlying question that is posed. While the above literature
concentrates mainly on the problem of social learning and efficiency, our study fo-
cuses on the effects of word-of-mouth communication, as a particular kind of social
interaction, on market outcomes, and in particular prices. With this respect, the
work of Kirman (1993) is, perhaps, most closely related.
Both methodologically and analytically, our model is close to early work of
Fo¨llmer (1974) on random economies. Fo¨llmer studies the existence and proper-
ties of equilibria in an economy where individual preferences of agents are random
and depend on the local environment of agents. Our approach is similar to Fo¨llmer’s
analysis in the sense that we also consider agents’ characteristics as being depen-
dent on their local environment. However, the model differs in two main respects.
Firstly, we model agents’ beliefs rather than preferences. Secondly, our model ex-
plicitly considers a dynamic framework that captures the evolution of beliefs over
time. Equilibria with respect to the interaction between agents are stationary (or,
invariant) distributions of the underlying stochastic process.
To the extent that we model the evolution of agents’ beliefs in a market econ-
omy our approach is also close to Blume and Easley (1992) and Sandroni (2000).
However, while this literature is mostly interested in the idea of market selection
and convergence to rational expectations, our focus here is somewhat different. For
example, we do not distinguish between beliefs that are rational, i.e., correct, and
beliefs that are not. In fact, we do not even assume that correct beliefs exist at all.
2This avoids also some unpleasant problem: it is known that the long-run behaviour of the
approximating deterministic system can be very different from the one of the original stochastic
process. See, for example, Blume (1997) on this issue.
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Instead our main aim is to show how different beliefs are able to diffuse within in
a market economy that is structured by local communication and how the diffusion
of these beliefs affects market outcomes.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic set-up to analyze
the spread of a rumour. We define individual beliefs and describe how the rumour
affects the beliefs of agents in the economy. The transmission dynamic of the rumour
is based on word-of-mouth communication between neighbouring agents, leading to
a stochastic process that models the evolution of the rumour in time. The set of
invariant distributions of this process is given and convergence to invariant distrib-
utions is characterized. Section 3 applies the set-up to a simple market situation,
in which agents can trade Arrow securities. We calculate so-called long-run equilib-
rium prices, where markets clear given that beliefs form an invariant distribution.
Our results support the empirical finding of a price run-up for the security that is
positively targeted by the rumour. Section 4 concludes with possible generalizations
of the model.
2 Rumours
2.1 Structure of the Economy
Consider the following economy. There is a countable infinite set of agents located on
the one-dimensional integer lattice Z.3 Identify each agent with his or her location, so
Z represents the set of agents. Typically, agents are denoted as x, y, z ∈ Z. Assume
the economy to be endowed with a neighbourhood structure of local interaction. For
every agent x ∈ Z let N(x) = {y ∈ Z| |y − x| = 1} be the set of neighbours, where
| · | denotes the Euclidean distance in Z.
In our model neighbourhoods specify the range of social interaction of agents,
where social interaction is assumed to mean communication of a rumour. An agent
x ∈ Z directly communicates with his adjacent neighbours y ∈ N(x). However,
since neighbourhoods are overlapping he also communicates indirectly with all other
agents in the economy. This seems a natural assumption, in particular for situations
of word-of-mouth communication that we have in mind.
We assume that there are two possible states of the world s ∈ {1, 2}. At any
time an agent in the economy is characterized by his beliefs about the states of the
world. Time is continuous. Let θt(x) ∈ [0, 1] be the belief of agent x at time t ≥ 0
3The assumption of dimension one is not critical. Results similarly hold for any higher dimen-
sional lattice. This follows from the fact that the relevant behaviour of the underlying stochastic
process (the contact process) is independent of the dimension of the lattice (cf. Liggett, 1985).
4
that s = 1 is the true state of the world. Consequently, 1 − θt(x) is the belief of
agent x that s = 2 is the true state of the world. To give an example with regard to
rumours, suppose, e.g., that s = 1 models the state of the world where eventually,
a given firm is the object of a takeover and s = 2 where it is not. In our model, a
rumour will affect the beliefs of agents about the different states of the world.4
We assume that there exists a pre-rumour belief b ∈ [0, 1] that models the beliefs
in the economy before the rumour appears. Once the rumour is introduced at say,
t = t0, it affects beliefs of those agents that communicate the rumour. In particular,
we assume that the rumour induces a shift in beliefs from b to some other belief
b˜ 6= b. Thus, after the rumour has appeared beliefs in the economy can be described
as follows. For any agent x at time t ≥ t0,
θt(x) =
{
b if x is not affected by rumour
b˜ if x is affected by rumour,
(1)
with b, b˜ ∈ [0, 1].
2.2 Communication of the Rumour
Having defined the general structure of the economy and the relation between ru-
mour and beliefs, the next step is to define the transmission dynamic of the rumour.
The main idea is that agents who are affected by the rumour are also the ones that
communicate the rumour to their neighbours.
Formally, we model the rumour dynamic as an interacting particle system, the
latter being a continuous-time Markov process on the state space of all configura-
tions of beliefs in the economy Θ := {θ|θ : Z → {b, b˜}}. (See Liggett (1985) for a
good introduction into the theory of interacting particle systems.) The main ob-
jective in order to define an interacting particle system is to specify so-called flip
rates r(x, θt) ∈ [0,∞) for x ∈ Z, θt ∈ Θ. In our model, these rates determine the
probability that given configuration θt at time t ≥ 0, agent x changes his belief θt(x)
in such a way that for δ ↓ 0
Prob[θt+δ(x) 6= θt(x)] = r(x, θt)δ + o(δ). (2)
We make the following assumptions.
Assumption 1 If no neighbouring agent is affected by the rumour, the probability
for an agent, who is not yet affected by the rumour, to become affected is zero. On
4In the market economy that is considered in the next section the two states will represent the
fact that one out of two Arrow securities pays out rather than the other.
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the other hand, if at least one neighbour is affected by the rumour, the probability to
become affected by the rumour oneself is strictly positive. Moreover, this probability
is strictly increasing in the number of neighbours that are affected by the rumour.
Formally, if θ(x) = b,
r(x, θ) = λ
∑
y∈N(x)
1{θ(y)=b˜}, (3)
with 0 < λ <∞.
Due to the lack of evidence that is typically involved in the transmission of a
rumour (agents do not know whether the rumour is true or not), the probability
with which an agent believes whether a rumour is true depends on the number of
neighbours that communicate the rumour. Intuitively, if I hear a story once, I may
believe it or not, but if I hear it also from another person there must at least be
something in it that is true. Therefore Assumption 1 says that every neighbour who
communicates the rumour increases the probability for an agent to become affected
by the rumour and in consequence also to start spreading the rumour himself. The
result is that the rumour follows a dynamic which is similar to an infection process.
Assumption 2 Agents can forget the rumour. The probability to forget the rumour
is constant and independent of neighbours. Formally, if θ(x) = b˜, r(x, θ) = 1.
Due to other objects that may appear in everyday communication the importance
or relevance of a rumour may decline. In consequence, agents that have heard the
rumour may stop thinking of it and forget about it after a while. This assumption
should not be confused with the main idea that rumours are reinforced by frequent
hearing. Since the latter effect is already captured by Assumption 1, the possiblity
to forget the rumour is simply introduced as a counter-dynamic to the spread of
the rumour. Not having such an assumption would imply that every agent, who
is infected by rumour once, would continue spreading it forever. The constant
probability assumption is made to keep the model simple. It can be generalized —
without changing the results — to non-constant probabilities, which are decreasing
with the number of neighbours that communicate the rumour. In that case, the fact
that neighbours confirm the rumour does have an influence on forgetting. (See the
discussion in Section 4.) In our model, the forget rate is normalized to 1. Since any
multiplication of flip rates by some constant leads to the same type of dynamics,
such normalization allows us to control the relationship between forgetting and being
infected by the rumour via the single parameter λ. Definition 1 summarizes our two
assumptions.
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Definition 1 For every x ∈ Z and θ ∈ Θ,
r(x, θ) =
 λ
∑
y∈N(x)
1{θ(y)=b˜} if θ(x) = b
1 if θ(x) = b˜,
(4)
with 0 < λ <∞.
In our model the parameter λ is constant and exogenous. It determines the
degree of social interaction and communication between neighbours. In this sense
it also captures the willingness of agents to talk about the rumour. If λ was equal
to zero there would be no communication between neighbours, a situation we shall
not be interested in during the following. If λ > 0, the value directly determines the
probability for an agent to become infected by the rumour by talking to one of his
neighbours. As it can be seen from equations (4) and (2), the higher the value of λ
the higher this probability is.
By Definition 1 the dynamics of the rumour follow those of the so-called contact
process. This process was first studied by Harris (1974), see also Chapter VI of
Liggett (1985). All results on the spread of the rumour within the economy are
based on the evolutionary behaviour of the contact process.
2.3 Evolution of the Rumour
We now analyze the evolution of the rumour, i.e., the process {θt}t≥0. Suppose that
the rumour appears at time t0 = 0. We assume that the initial configuration of
beliefs is randomly determined by some probability distribution µ0 on Θ.
There exists a canonical one-to-one correspondence between the space Θ and the
space ∆ = {A| A ⊂ Z}. The function χ : Θ→ ∆ maps each configuration of beliefs
θ into χ(θ) = {x| θ(x) = b˜}, the set of agents that are infected by rumour. It is
often convenient to think of {θt}t≥0 as a process on ∆. Using this correspondence
we denote by δA the Dirac measure that puts probability one on the configuration
where exactly all agents x ∈ A ⊂ Z are infected by the rumour.
The first observation is the following. For any parameter value λ, the Dirac
measure δ∅, putting full mass on the configuration θ = ∅, where nobody in the
economy is affected by the rumour, is an invariant distribution of the process {θt}t≥0.
Once nobody in the economy is affected by the rumour the rumour will be gone
forever. There is no spontaneous source for the rumour except at time zero.
The second and crucial observation is that — in spite of its simplicity — the
rumour exhibits a phase transition.5 This means that there exists a critical value λ∗
5The phenomenon of phase transitions has been studied in other economic applications before.
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such that for any λ < λ∗, δ∅ is the unique invariant distribution and therefore also
the unique limiting distribution independent of initial conditions. In this case the
evolution of the rumour is ergodic. However, for any λ > λ∗, the set of invariant
measures is equal to the convex set spanned by the extremal measures δ∅ and νλ,
where the latter is the limiting distribution obtained from starting with the initial
configuration θ = Z, i.e., the configuration where everybody is affected by the ru-
mour. Hence, λ∗ is the critical value where the ergodicity of the rumour breaks
down. Obviously, the interesting regime — also from an economic point of view —
is the non-ergodic one, since only then the rumour has a chance to affect market
behaviour at all. The following proposition is a well-known result for the contact
process. For a proof see, e.g., Liggett (1985).
Proposition 1 There exists a critical value λ∗ < ∞, such that ∀λ < λ∗, δ∅ is
the unique invariant and limiting distribution of the rumour. If λ > λ∗, the set
of invariant distributions is equal to the non-degenerate convex set I = {ν | ν =
σδ∅ + (1 − σ)νλ, 0 ≤ σ ≤ 1}. The measure νλ is non-trivial in the sense that
νλ(θ = ∅) = 0. It is obtained as the limit νλ = limt→∞ µt, when µ0 is the initial
distribution of the rumour putting probability one on configuration θ = Z.
Since νλ(θ = ∅) = 0, the measure νλ ensures that with probability one at least
some agent in the economy has belief b˜, i.e., is infected by rumour. Hence, conver-
gence to the distribution νλ corresponds to saying that the rumour will be persis-
tently present in the economy, while convergence to the distribution δ∅ corresponds
to saying that the rumour disappears. This motivates the following definition.
Definition 2 For given λ let µt be the distribution of the rumour at time t. The
rumour disappears if limt→∞ µt = δ∅, or equivalently, limt→∞ µt(θ = ∅) = 1. If
λ > λ∗, the rumour is persistently present if limt→∞ µt = νλ. In this case
limt→∞ µt(θ(x) = b˜) > 0 for every x ∈ Z.
Passing from the ergodic to the non-ergodic regime the behaviour of the process
undergoes an abrupt change. While in the first regime it is sure that the rumour
will disappear for every initial distribution, in the second regime the evolution of
the process is much more ambiguous. Since the set of invariant distributions I is
no longer a singleton but the whole “interval” between δ∅ and νλ, in principle any
See, e.g., Fo¨llmer (1974) for an early economic analysis of phase transitions in the situation of a
random exchange economy. Other examples include Allen (1982) and Durlauf (1993). For a short
and rather informal introduction into the economic sense of phase transitions see also Hors (1995)
and Hors and Lordon (1997).
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measure ν ∈ I is a candidate for the limiting distribution of the process starting
with some initial distribution µ0. The next proposition clarifies the evolution of the
rumour for arbitrary initial distributions. For a proof see again Liggett (1985). A
special class of initial distributions, for which the evolution can be determined very
easily, is the class of translation invariant distributions.6
Let τ be the stopping time for the rumour to enter the state θ = ∅. Denote τµ0
the stopping time when starting with initial distribution µ0.
Proposition 2 Consider the case where λ > λ∗. Let µ0 be any arbitrary initial
distribution. Then
ν = lim
t→∞µt = σδ∅ + (1− σ)νλ, (5)
where σ = Prob[τµ0 <∞], i.e., σ equals the probability for the rumour to disappear
in finite time. If µ0 is translation invariant, σ = µ0(θ = ∅).
For translation invariant distributions the value of σ determining the mixture
between δ∅ and νλ is explicitly given by the probability for the initial configuration to
be θ = ∅, signifying that nobody in the economy hears the rumour at the beginning.
Once we can ensure this probability to be zero we obtain weak convergence to
distribution νλ, thus we know that the rumour will be persistently present in the
economy for any time in the future. At the same time, we see that the rumour
dies out if and only if the initial state equals θ = ∅, µ0-almost surely, i.e., at the
beginning there is simply nobody who is infected by the rumour.
This result has a nice consequence. Assume for example that at the beginning
everybody in the economy has the same chance to hear the rumour. In order to
model this, consider the initial distribution to be determined as follows. A random
process independently assigns to each agent belief b or b˜. Assume this process to be
binomially distributed with parameter ², i.e., we get the Bernoulli product measure
µ² with µ²(θ(x) = b˜) = ², for every agent x ∈ Z. In this situation σ = µ²(θ = ∅) = 0
if and only if ² > 0. Thus, if we know that the probability for every agent in the
economy to hear the rumour is strictly positive, we can conclude that in consequence
the rumour will never die out but will be persistently present, even if ² is arbitrarily
small. Only if ² = 0 the rumour will (trivially) die out since it will not even be
known at the beginning.
6A probability measure µ on Θ is translation invariant if for any finite collection of sites
(x1, . . . , xk), with xj ∈ Z, any profile (i1, . . . , ik), with ij ∈ {b, b˜}, k ≥ 1, and z ∈ Z
µ
(
θ(z + x1) = i1, . . . , θ(z + xk) = ik
)
= µ
(
θ(x1) = i1, . . . , θ(xk) = ik
)
,
i.e., probabilities do not depend on z.
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The assumption of µ0 being translation invariant can be very restrictive. As we
have just seen, this means that everybody has in fact the same access to relevant
information, an assumption that is often too strong for many economic situations.
We may therefore also be interested in initial distributions where the rumour starts
spreading from an arbitrary given set of agents A ∈ ∆. In this case the situation
looks as follows (cf. Liggett, 1985). If A is finite, we loose weak convergence, i.e.,
σ > 0. However, as long as A is nonempty it holds that σ < 1, i.e., the probability for
the rumour to survive is strictly positive. Moreover, σ monotonically decreases as A
grows. In particular, if A is infinite, σ = 0, i.e., we again obtain weak convergence to
the distribution νλ, independent on how dense the initial set A of infected agents is.
Thus, in our model the rumour is persistently present with probability one whenever
the initial distribution contains an infinite number of agents that are infected. If
this number is finite (but larger than zero), the rumour is persistently present with
probability that is strictly positive and increases with the number of agents that
are initially infected. For the following analysis, when it comes to persistence of the
rumour we are therefore mostly interested in initial distributions where A is either
infinite or where it is finite but large.
Finally, Griffeath (1981) and Durrett and Griffeath (1983) have shown that for
both λ < λ∗ and λ > λ∗, convergence to invariant distributions is exponentially
rapid. In consequence, both measures δ∅ and νλ may serve as good approximations
for the distribution of the rumour as time has sufficiently passed.
3 Markets
3.1 Equilibrium Prices of Arrow Securities
In this section we apply our model of a rumour economy to a simple market situation.
Corresponding to our two states of the world, we assume that there are two Arrow
securities, each paying a return of 1 in case the corresponding state of the world oc-
curs, and zero otherwise. Let qs(x) be agent x’s holding of Arrow security s ∈ {1, 2}.
We assume that each agent has an initial endowment of securities ω = (ω1, ω2) and
a utility function u depending on income, that is sufficiently well-behaved (i.e., con-
tinuously differentiable, strictly increasing and strictly quasiconcave on IR).7
Given belief θ(x), agent x ∈ Z maximizes his expected utility choosing the opti-
7It is possible to allow individual endowments to be drawn from a family of i.i.d. random
variables that operate on a given set of endowments. However, as such a setting does not change
our results substantially (in equilibrium the role of fixed endowments is taken by expected endow-
ments), we stick to the simpler framework and assume that endowments are identical.
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mal portfolio (q1, q2), i.e.,
max
q1,q2
θ(x)u(q1) + (1− θ(x))u(q2), (6)
satisfying his budget constraint p1(q1 − ω1) + p2(q2 − ω2) = 0 and taking security
prices p = (p1, p2) as given. Due to our assumptions on utility the solution to (6)
defines a single-valued, continuous demand function of agent x for security s that is
strictly decreasing in ps and strictly increasing in the belief agent x holds for state
s. We denote this function by qs(x, θ(x), ω, p) with s ∈ {0, 1}.
Example. Assume agent’s utility function to be logarithmic in income: u(w) =
log(w). In this case demand equals
q1(x, θ(x), ω, p) =
θ(x)
p1
(p1ω1 + p2ω2), (7)
q2(x, θ(x), ω, p) =
1− θ(x)
p2
(p1ω1 + p2ω2). (8)
Methodologically, our set-up is related to the model of Fo¨llmer (1974), who stud-
ies an exchange economy on a random field. In fact, the rumour economy described
in the previous section is a dynamic analogue to the random field approach. We
can therefore use Fo¨llmer’s definition of an equilibrium price. Let µ be a probability
measure on the space of belief configurations Θ.
Definition 3 Given a distribution µ on the space of belief configurations Θ, a price
vector p = (p1, p2) is an equilibrium price vector if
lim
n→∞
1
|Bn|
∑
x∈Bn
qs(x, θ(x), ω, p)− ωs = 0, µ− a.s. (9)
for s ∈ {1, 2}, where Bn is the box of size n centered around the origin, i.e., Bn =
{−n/2, . . . , n/2} for n even.
Equilibrium prices are prices where per capita expected excess demand equals
zero, µ-a.s.. Note that this requires the equality in (9) to hold for all configurations
that have positive probability given the measure µ. In other words, for equilibrium
prices p markets clear whatever configuration of the economy is actually realized.
Let µt be the distribution of the rumour at time t. From the analysis in the pre-
ceding section we know that, taking the limit t→∞, the distribution µt converges
to an invariant distribution of the rumour. If λ < λ∗, the unique invariant distribu-
tion is δ∅. The rumour always disappears. If λ > λ∗, the rumour stays persistently
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present for a large class of initial distributions, i.e., we obtain limt→∞ µt = νλ. More-
over, convergence to equilibrium δ∅, if λ < λ∗, and to νλ, if λ > λ∗, is exponentially
rapid. Hence, both limiting distributions may serve as an approximation for the dis-
tribution of the rumour when t is large, that is when the rumour has been around in
the population for a sufficient amount of time. We use this approximation in order
to calculate so-called long-run equilibrium prices.
Before doing so, however, we prove that finite time equilibrium prices converge to
long-run equilibrium prices of the economy. This guarantees that our model forms
indeed a coherent set-up.
Proposition 3 Let µt be the distribution of beliefs in the economy at time t. Assume
limt→∞ µt = ν with ν ∈ {δ∅, νλ}. For any time t, let pt be an equilibrium price at
time t. Denote p∗ = limt→∞ pt. Then p∗ is an equilibrium price for the limiting
distribution ν.
Proof: The claim is proven by contradiction. By Definition 3 in order for p∗ to form
an equilibrium price for the distribution ν, per capita expected excess demand must
be equal to zero, ν-a.s., i.e.,
ζs(θ, ω, p
∗) := lim
n→∞
1
|Bn|
∑
x∈Bn
qs(x, θ(x), ω, p
∗)− ωs = 0, ν − a.s.
for s ∈ {1, 2}. Suppose that ν
(
ζs(θ, ω, p
∗) 6= 0
)
> 0 for some s ∈ {0, 1}. Since ν is
the weak limit of the sequence of distributions {µt}t≥0, this implies that
µt
(
ζs(θ, ω, p
∗) 6= 0
)
> 0,
for t sufficiently large. By continuity of ζ with respect to p (which follows from the
continuity of the individual demand function) we get that
µt
(
lim
r→∞ ζs(θ, ω, p
r) 6= 0
)
> 0,
for t sufficiently large. But this implies that eventually there is some r > 0 for which
µr
(
ζs(θ, ω, p
r) 6= 0
)
> 0.
Since pr is an equilibrium price for the distribution at time r, this gives the contra-
diction. 2
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3.2 Long-run Equilibrium Prices
With regard to long-run equilibrium prices, the crucial fact we can exploit is the
observation that for distribution ν ∈ {δ∅, νλ} the following holds for any price vector
p, ν-a.s.:
lim
n→∞
1
|Bn|
∑
x∈Bn
qs(x, θ(x), ω, p)− ωs = Eν [qs(0, θ(0), ω, p)− ωs] (10)
with s ∈ {1, 2} and 0 denoting the agent located at the origin. This follows from
ergodic theory since both measures δ∅ and νλ are translation invariant and extremal
within the set of translation invariant measures (cf. Liggett, 1985). Intuitively,
equation (10) shows that we can aggregate the information in the economy with
regard to per capita excess demand by looking at the expected excess demand of the
agent at site zero, who thus acts as a true “representative agent” for the economy.
Note, however, that this relation breaks down as soon as we consider any other
invariant distribution for the rumour, i.e., a real mixture of both extremal measures
δ∅ and νλ. In that case we are left with equation (9) again.
Applying Definition 3 to distributions ν ∈ {δ∅, νλ}, the condition for long-run
equilibrium prices thus reduces to a much simpler one: a price vector p is a long-run
equilibrium price vector for the distribution ν ∈ {δ∅, νλ} iff
Eν [qs(0, θ(0), ω, p)− ωs] = 0 (11)
for s ∈ {1, 2}. For notational convenience, let us denote by αν := ν(θ(0) = b˜) the
probability that agent 0 is infected by rumour given distribution ν ∈ {δ∅, νλ}.
Our first result shows that assuming that endowments are strictly positive and
beliefs are not extreme long-run equilibrium prices exist.
Proposition 4 Suppose that ω > 0 and b, b˜ /∈ {0, 1}. Then for ν ∈ {δ∅, νλ} a
long-run equilibrium price exists.
Proof: Given distribution ν ∈ {δ∅, νλ}, expected excess demand of agent 0 for
security s ∈ {0, 1} equals
Eν [qs(0, θ(0), ω, p)− ωs]
= (1− αν)qs(0, b, ω, p) + ανqs(0, b˜, ω, p)− ωs
= (1− αν)
(
qs(0, b, ω, p)− ωs
)
+ αν
(
qs(0, b˜, ω, p)− ωs
)
. (12)
Because the right hand side of (12) is a continuous function that is positive for
ps sufficiently small and negative for ps sufficiently large, there exists a price vector
p = (p1, p2) such that the above function equals zero for s ∈ {0, 1}. 2
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Example (continued). If u(w) = log(w), equilibrium prices can be calculated
directly. In this case, the excess demand function is linear in beliefs, which implies
that
Eν [q1(0, θ(0), ω, p)− ω1] = γ
p1
(p1ω1 + p2ω2)− ω1, (13)
Eν [q2(0, θ(0), ω, p)− ω2] = 1− γ
p2
(p1ω1 + p2ω2)− ω2, (14)
where γ := (1 − αν)b + αν b˜ is the expected belief of agent 0. Combining both
equations, implies that
p1
p2
=
γ
1− γ
ω2
ω1
. (15)
Thus, if utility is logarithmic in income, relative equilibrium prices are determined
by the ratio of the expected belief of agent 0 times the inverse ratio of endowments.
3.3 Rumour Effects
The following proposition contains our main result showing the effect that rumours
can have on prices in the economy.
Proposition 5 If the rumour disappears, long-run equilibrium prices reflect pre-
rumour beliefs. If, however, the rumour stays persistently present, long-run equilib-
rium prices deviate from pre-rumour values. The rumour generates a price run-up
for the security that is positively targeted by the rumour.
Proof: Suppose first that the rumour disappears, i.e., ν = δ∅ and hence αν = αδ∅ = 0.
In this case, the equilibrium equation simplifies to
qs(0, b, ω, p)− ωs = 0,
for s ∈ {0, 1}. Prices are determined by the pre-rumour belief b only.
Suppose next that the rumour stays persistently present, i.e., the process con-
verges to νλ, in which case αν = ανλ > 0. Suppose the rumour is positive about
state 1, i.e., b˜ > b. The equilibrium price for security 1 has to meet the condition
(1− ανλ)
(
q1(0, b, ω, p)− ω1
)
+ ανλ
(
q1(0, b˜, ω, p)− ω1
)
= 0. (16)
Let pb1 be the equilibrium price reflecting pre-rumour beliefs. Clearly, p
b
1 sets the
first term on the left hand side equal to zero. The second term, however, is strictly
positive, as demand is strictly increasing in the belief and b˜ > b. Now, since demand
is strictly decreasing in the price p1, the long-run equilibrium price — if the rumour
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stays persistenly present — must be strictly larger than pb1. Thus, the rumour
generates a price run-up for security 1. 2
The driving force behind the rumour effect in Proposition 5 is intuitive. Since
the rumour contains positive information about the likelihood of state 1, it induces
those agents, who are affected by the rumour, to shift part of their demand to the
corresponding security. This eventually leads to an increase of the equilibrium price
p1. The particular feature of our model is that the shift in demand is an endogenous
result of the spread and survival of the rumour in the economy. The observation of
a price run-up has been made in an early study of Rose (1951) and more recently
also by Pound and Zeckhauser (1990) and Zivney et al. (1996). To our knowledge
the present model provides the first analytical foundation for this finding.
The solution to equation (16) depends on ανλ = νλ(θ(0) = b˜), i.e., the probability
that agent 0 is infected by rumour given distribution νλ, which again depends on
λ capturing the intensity of communication between agents. Using a result from
Liggett (1985, Theorem 1.33, Chapter VI), who shows that for λ ≥ 2, νλ(θ(0) =
b˜) ≥ 1
2
+
√
1
4
− 1
2λ
, we see that ανλ monotonically increases with λ and converges to 1
as λ goes to infinity. In consequence, in the limit the influence of pre-rumour belief
b vanishes completely, and long-run equilibrium prices are uniquely determined by
rumour beliefs b˜.
Proposition 6 As communication becomes stronger, long-run equilibrium prices
are more strongly affected by rumour. In the limit (λ =∞), prices deviate completely
from pre-rumour beliefs, i.e., are determined by rumour beliefs only.
Intensifying the communication increases the probability for agents to eventually
believe in the rumour, thereby shifting beliefs and demand towards the security that
is positively targeted by the rumour. Our model predicts that the price run-up for
the security is the stronger the hotter the communication is.
Example (continued). Consider the logarithmic-utility case again. From equation
(15) it can immediately be seen that long-run equilibrium prices equal
p1
p2
=
b
1− b
ω2
ω1
(17)
if the rumour disappears. If the rumour stays present,
p1
p2
=
γ
1− γ
ω2
ω1
, (18)
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with αν > 0. Assuming b˜ > b, it follows that γ > b, and hence equilibrium price p1 is
higher if the rumour stays around than if it disappears. How large can this effect be?
Consider, e.g., the following situation. Suppose that 0 < b < 1
2
and b˜ ≈ 1. Thus, be-
fore appearance of the rumour the general opinion in the market is slightly in favour
of state 2, while agents that are affected by rumour believe that state 1 is the true
state with very high probability.8 From equation (15) and Proposition 6 it follows
that, if we let λ go to infinity, i.e., intensify the communication between agents, and
consider the limit of long-run prices as b˜ approaches 1, i.e., as beliefs become more
extreme, the ratio of relative prices converges to infinity: limb˜→1 limλ→∞
p1
p2
= ∞.
That is, there exists no finite upper bound for the relative price run-up for the secu-
rity that is positively targeted by the rumour if communication and rumour-effects
become extreme.
4 Discussion
The model in this paper focuses on a rumour as a particular example of information
transmission, affecting beliefs of agents who trade within a two-good exchange econ-
omy. The aim has been to look for reasonable dynamics that model the evolution
of a rumour and that can be used to answer questions concerning the impact of
rumours on economic variables, such as market demand and, especially, equilibrium
prices. Still, there are a lot of issues that have to be addressed in order to obtain a
true understanding of the relation between rumours and markets. We conclude the
paper by discussing some of them.
Endogeneous Infection Rate. One of the most important elements is certainly
the parameter λ that determines the probability for uninformed agents to be in-
fected by the rumour from neighbours. While in the present model λ was modelled
exogeneously, an obvious extension is to endogenize that parameter and derive it
from other variables. With this respect, a crucial variable will then be an agent’s
subjective value of the information that is transmitted. This again could be linked
to prices of some commodities or expected returns of an investment opportunity,
depending on the situation one wants to analyze. In any case, the next step is to
connect the transmission of the rumour in some way or other with agents’ behavior
in the market and derive it from agents’ decision-making procedure. Here, Banerjee
(1993) represents a promising attempt using a Bayesian updating approach. Other
ideas may come from alternative models focusing on individual and social learning.
8The assumption that 0 < b < 12 is not necessary, any b /∈ {0, 1} will do it.
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Heterogeneity. Analytical results for a true endogenization of λ seem technically
very demanding. A first step is to incorporate some heterogeneity into the system.
Suppose, for instance, that agents have different forget-rates. Each agent x ∈ Z
is infected by the rumour with equal rate λ (times the number of neighbours that
communicate the rumour) but has an individual forget-rate c(x). To keep things
simple suppose that any agent x within a subset X ⊂ Z has a forget-rate equal to
c(x) = c < 1, while all other agents x /∈ X have rate c(x) = 1. Thus, agents within
X are less forgetful or perhaps more enthusiastic in communicating a rumour.9 If
the set X is sufficiently dense it will affect the evolution of the rumour in the sense
that the critical value λ∗ is strictly smaller than before. In consequence, the rumour
has a greater chance to survive. Precisely, if X is such that there exists a length
l so that each interval of length l in Z contains at least one agent x ∈ X, then
λ∗(X) < λ∗, where λ∗(X) denotes the critical value of the system governed with
lower forget-rates in X and λ∗ is the critical value obtained in the present model
(Madras, Schinazi, and Schonmann, 1994). On the other hand, if X is sufficiently
thin the behaviour of the system stays the same. Madras et al. give a condition
where it is sufficient that for every distance d there are only finitely many pairs of
agents in X, who are located not further than d apart from each other.
Bramson, Durrett, and Schonmann (1991) have analyzed the system when the
distribution of different forget rates within the population is determined by some
i.i.d. random process. Suppose that initially, before the rumour spreads, each agent
is told his personal forget-rate. With probability p he has a forget rate equal to
c < 1 and with probability 1 − p he has a rate equal to 1, where p ∈ (0, 1). It
is easy to imagine that the resulting set of agents, to which the rate c is assigned,
is sufficiently dense within the population. Therefore the critical value leading to
survival of the rumour is strictly smaller than before.
Non-constant Forget-rates. As mentioned above the part of Assumption 2 that
assumes forget-rates to be constant and independent of the number of neighbours,
who confirm the rumour, can be relaxed without changing the main results of the
model. Suppose, for example, that flip rates are defined as follows. For x ∈ Z, θ ∈ Θ
set
r(x, θ) =

λ
∑
y∈N(x)
1{θ(y)=b˜} if θ(x) = b
1
3
if θ(x) = b˜ and θ(x− 1) = θ(x+ 1) = b˜
1
2
if θ(x) = b˜ and θ(x− 1) 6= θ(x+ 1)
1 if θ(x) = b˜ and θ(x− 1) = θ(x+ 1) = b.
(19)
9I believe everybody would know at least one person of this type.
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If agent x is affected by the rumour and both neighbours confirm the rumour,
the forget-rate is equal to 1
3
and in this case it is also the smallest. It increases as the
number of confirming neighbours decreases. When no agent in the neighbourhood
communicates the rumour the probability to forget the rumour is at its highest
value, which is again normalized to one. Using a standard dominance argument
the following holds: every rumour that stays persistently present under the original
dynamic stays persistently present under the dynamic in (19) as well. The intuition
lies at hand. Since agents are only less likely to forget when confirmation of the
rumour has an effect, the possibility for the rumour to spread around and stay
present becomes only larger. Therefore, results hold the same as before.
Rumours and Trade. In the present model we have not calculated equilibrium
prices for the market described by a distribution different than δ∅ and νλ. Although
the generality of the model would allow for a definition of such a price the relevant
equations are rather difficult to be solved. The model is consistent in the sense that
any sequence of finite time equilibrium prices converges to a long-run equilibrium
price. While the long-run approach serves as an approximation for the general
situation, a richer model will connect the rumour with trading behaviour more
directly. Then, it will be interesting not only to look for impacts of the rumour on
trade, but also for the possible effects trading may have with regard to the evolution
of the rumour.
In order to capture such effects, however, the behaviour of an agent must depend
not only on the behaviour of his neighbours but also on the behaviour of the whole
economy aggregated in current prices of goods. The difficulty of such a model is
less on the behavioural than on the mathematical side. For example, it is rather
reasonable to assume that an increase in the price of a good, e.g. shares of some
well-known company, together with a rumour on that good, e.g. a takeover rumour,
will make an agent believe the rumour even more to be true. In consequence, the
probability to get infected by the rumour will be higher as well. Mathematically,
however, this leads to a major conceptual change of the model. While in the present
model, the state of an agent x depends only on the beliefs of his neighbors y ∈ N(x),
the modified model incorporates a dependence of x on the whole configuration θ.
Since this produces a feedback of interaction, the first question is whether such a
system can be well-defined at all. If so, the next problem is how do equilibria look
like. The difference to the present model is that now equilibria for the stochastic
process, in the sense of invariant distributions, and equilibria for the market, in
the sense of clearing prices, are highly connected with each other. It appears an
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open question in which manner such a system can be analyzed and how interesting
results can be obtained. Nevertheless, the project is of particular interest since the
influence of macrodata, such as market prices, inflation rates, growth rates, share
indices, and many more, on the decision making of individuals lies at hand. There
are first attempts in that direction that build on work of Fo¨llmer (1979, 1980). See,
e.g., Tu¨rnich (1995) for more.
Counter-Rumours and New Information. Finally, an interesting project is
to study the possible rise of counter-rumours and the effect of different refutation
strategies as special examples of new information in the economy. While the explicit
dynamics of a counter-rumour that contains information contrary to the original ru-
mour may be difficult to be analyzed, effects of refutation strategies can be examined
already in the present model.10 Note that the current set-up allows for two possibil-
ities to change the evolution of the rumour. The first is on the set of agents being
affected by the rumour, the second on the degree of communication between agents.
A firm may want to influence the number of people infected by the rumour, and
it can do so, for instance, by circulating specific information through the national
press or other official media. Depending on the information that is published the
current configuration of beliefs θ will be affected by manipulating agents’ individual
beliefs θ(x), x ∈ Z. For example, information that strongly confirms the rumour
is expected to increase the number of agents that have belief b˜, while information
that refutes the rumour aims at strongly decreasing that number. Similarly, new
information can also influence the degree of communication of the rumour between
agents. It can rise general interest into the topic, which in the model would lead
to an increase of λ, as well as it can make the rumour less important to the public
thereby decreasing λ. However, official refutation or denial of a rumour can well
turn into a counter-productive strategy. When the refutation does not lower the
probability to believe in the rumour but increases only the number of agents that
hear the rumour and perhaps also the interest of people to talk about the rumour
it may be better to keep quiet and wait until the rumour (hopefully) disappears.
In particular, the model suggests that whenever λ < λ∗ an official refutation may
do more harm than good to the situation, since it may well increase λ making the
rumour possibly even persistent, while otherwise it dies out for sure. Similarly, if
initially the rumour is known only to a small number of agents it may be a risky
strategy for a firm to combat the rumour in public, since it may attract only more
10While the object of a takeover rumour may, perhaps, be interested in a price run-up for its
shares, the situation looks much different in case the rumour contains negative information about
a company. In that case our model predicts a fall in the respective price.
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publicity. By enlarging the set of rumour-infected agents the rumour becomes only
more likely to survive.
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